This paper explores the process of development from an epoch of Malthusian stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth. My paper unites the interests of economists, economic historians and demographers in studying the role of institutional improvement two centuries ago in launching the modern economic growth. The unified theory I develop captures many crucial phenomena emerging with Industrial Revolution, such as the rise of the saving rate, three phases accompanying demographic transition, human capital accumulation, bimodal distribution of income per capita. In addition, a question puzzling economic historians for a long time, that why Industrial Revolution was a European phenomenon, not happened in China, which was highly advanced in both technological level and industrial development as early as in the fourteenth century, is also tackled as one of historical evidence to buttress my theory. In contrast to previous literature, I model this process with two novel factors, from the perspectives of both institutions and the value of children. Stripped to essentials it states that in the original development phase of human life, since there were no social security or public pensions, and capital market was highly imperfect, people always chose high fertility as an alternative way of saving, expecting material support from children in their old age. As institutions improved, physical capital began to be accumulated. Due to capital-skill complementarity, the accumulation of physical capital is high enough, to some extent, to induce the emergence of human capital. Then, modern era, dominated by human capital accumulation, comes. Historical evidence from ancient China, and Britain during Industrial Revolution is employed to investigate the hypotheses.
1.INTRODUCTION
The question, why some countries are richer than others, is as old as economic science itself. Today, the gap between rich nations and poor nations is not converging, but diverging dramatically, especially in the postwar era. Many poor countries, mostly in Africa, experienced negative growth in income per capita in recent decades. For example, per capita income in Zambia was $1049.45 in 1969. However, after thirty years, it decreased to $765.24. In contrast, the rich countries experienced unprecedented growth and the typical example in them is the United States, where income per capita grew from $12,598 to $33,523 during this period. 1 The world distribution of GDP per worker has become bimodal (i.e. "twin peaks") with each country a member of either a poor or rich 'convergence club' (Quah, 1996; Galor, 1996; Kremer et al, 2001 ). However, the divergence is new from historical perspective. Kuznets (1965, p. 20) writes: "Before the nineteenth century and perhaps not much before it, some presently underdeveloped countries, notably China and parts of India, were believed by Europeans to be more highly developed than Europe, and at that earlier time their per capita incomes may have been higher than the then per capita incomes of the presently developed countries." Thus, "the current wide disparities -between rich and poor countries -are recent" (Kuznets, 1966, p. 393 ). I will
Figure 1: World Economic History in One Picture
Source: Clark (2005) 1. For evidence about economic growth in the last four decades, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) .
2. For details on the bifurcations in the figure, see Clark (2005) .
examine three periods characterizing the whole human history: Malthusian trap, Industrial Revolution and Modern Economic Growth, as depicted in Figure 1 . Recently, there is a renewed interest in the relationship between demographic transition and long-run economic growth. The purpose of this paper is to call attention to the strong relation between them. Traditional demographic transition theory states that societies that experience modernization progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high mortality to a post-modern one in which both are low. However, the process is not monotonic. As recently defined by Galor and Weil (2000) , the demographic transition experiences three regimes: the "Malthusian Regime," the "Post-Malthusian Regime," and the "Modern Growth Regime." Any theory attempts to describe the process of demographic transition must include these three periods. In the Malthusian Regime, as described by Galor and Weil (2000) , population growth rate was slight and income per capita was roughly constant; in the Post-Malthusian Regime, income per capita grew, in spite of at lower rate than that in modern times, and rising income was reflected in rising population growth rates; in the Modern Growth Regime, income per capita rises and population growth rate declines, both at an unprecedented rats. These are consistent with historical evidence that describes the experiences of many industrialized countries, such as Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany (McEvedy and Jones, 1978; Deane and Cole, 1967) .
The process of industrialization was accompanied with the rise of saving rate. 3 The rise of the saving rate was quite prevalent during the Industrial Revolution. The saving rate rises about three-fold during the process of industrialization, from 3-6% in the end of nineteenth century to 10-12% around 1900 (Deane and Cole, 1969) . My theory can also account for the rise of the saving rate during industrialization, but different from previous literature underlining the role played by structural change (Laitner 2000; Echevarria, 1997) . Based on the important contribution of physical capital to economic growth, Lewis (1954, p.155) places the rise of the saving rate at a central position in development economics, writing "The central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the process by which a community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5% of its national income or less, converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at about 12 to 15% of national income or more." Rostow (1962) makes a similar point. What is the mechanism behind the divergence and demographic transition? How are these two phenomena interrelated? Why is the disparity in income per capita so large between countries and where are they come from? How can we account for the big divergence in economic history? Why did the saving rate rise with industrialization? Why did Europe first take-off, not China, which possessed many more advantages much earlier? Did human capital really work during the initial period of economic development? Why did the population growth rate first rise and then fall during the industrial revolution? Why do the poor countries get poorer and rich countries get richer? Is the Malthusian economic stagnation unavoidable? 3. At current market prices, Maddison (1992) shows that in almost all the developed countries nowadays, such as Australia, Canada, France, notably Japan, total gross savings as a ratio of GDP rose, even lasting to the first half of twentieth century. For example, at the end of the nineteenth century, although the saving rate was already 12.4% in Japan, yet the saving rate increased three fold, to 36.1% in the 1960s, after half centuries' growth.
like the consumption goods approach, but the direction is reverse. The altruism flows from children to parents, not the other way around in the consumption goods approach. 9 This approach works definitely very well in the agricultural economy before industrialization. The poor agricultural societies make the impetus for having children as investment goods as the primary concern over consumption goods (Boldrin and Jones, 2002) . This is consistent with the empirical work provided by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) , which states that children have learned to work the parents' land better than people from outside the family. As argued by Folbre (1994) , in the pre-industrialization era, "Considerable evidence suggests that parents in the now-developed countries once enjoyed important economic benefits from child-rearing, not only because children began to work at an early age, but also because parental control over assets such as family farms gave them leverage over adult children. Restrictions on women's ability to support themselves outside of marriage lowered the opportunity costs of children and limited women's 5. Empirical evidence provided by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson(2004) shows that property rights institutions have a more powerful, and fundamental effect on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development, compared with other kinds of institutions.
6. Corruption is the usual form of insecure property market. The World Bank (2003) puts a great emphasis on corruption, and calls corruption as the 'single biggest obstacle to economic and social development'.
7. For empirical evidence on emphasizing the importance of institutions in explaining the big per capita income gap between countries, see Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Robinson (2001, 2002) , Easterly and Levine (2002) . For a recent survey, see Caselli (2003) .
8. Old age security hypothesis centers on the argument that children provide some form of insurance against risks when parents are old, which in turn, justifies parental investment in young children. Although investment in children may be risky (because they may die, be born with the wrong sex, be economic failures or disloyal), children still have the qualities that set them apart from other possible sources of old age insurance in developing countries, e.g., land or other assets.
9. For empirical evidence buttressing my argument that children provide old-age support, especially in developing countries, see Cigno and Rosati (1996) , Jensen, E.R., (1990) , Raut (1996) , Vlassoff (1990). ability to exercise reproductive choice. Similar factors contribute to high fertility in many developing countries". Karl Marx (1818 Marx ( -1883 , whose ideas about sociology and economics are one of the most influential in human history, also emphasized that children are investment goods. Samuelson (1958) makes a similar point that part of, or perhaps mainly the motivation of having children is providing old-age support to their parents. In modern times, even in developed countries, old-age hypothesis is always established.
10
My theory relates this well-known hypothesis with institutions, putting the human behavior as the basis of macroeconomic analysis. When institutions are bad, due to capital market imperfection or corruption, people always choose to have more children to substitute for saving. As institutions improve, since good institutions make people perceive the security of saving, population growth rate falls, other things being equal. This idea is formed on basis of the vast empirical evidence that countries with more developed financial markets or better social security programs tend to have lower population growth rates than those that do not, demonstrating that children are an alternative way of saving, especially in developing countries.
11 However, I do not deny the importance of social security in modern times, but see it as a contract, making the relationship more formal. As for the transition from old-age support to social security, Folbre (1994) writes, "The growth of labor markets and geographic mobility lowers the cost of defaulting on the implicit contracts of family life. Towards the end of the 19 th century, policy makers in both northwestern Europe and the United States expressed fears that adult children were taking less responsibility for the care of their elderly parents. Such fears provided part of the rationale for the collective provision of public old-age insurance." And in the end, she says, "In short, public policies have reinforced and perhaps even augmented income flows from the young to the old, giving the elderly formal claims upon the earnings of the younger generation. At the same time, the share of fathers' income transferred to mothers and children has declined, partly as a result of the growth of families maintained by women alone." Due to the homogenous economy in my model, the old age hypothesis and social security hypothesis are equivalent, for the share of taking from current generation's income is fixed. Marrying social security and old-age hypothesis, my paper has both historical and modern implications. The last hypothesis employed in my paper is capital-skill complementarity, which states that increases (decreases) in the capital-skill ratio increase (decrease) the relative demand for skilled labor and, hence, increase (decrease) relative wages, first proposed by Griliches (1969) , has received renewed attention in the macroeconomics literature, and is widely used theoretically by Moav (2000, 2004) , Weil (2000), and Stockey (1996) .
12 It predicts that skilled workers will be endowed with more capital and suggests that physical capital needs 10. Ehrlich and Lui (1991) provide evidence to show that even in advanced economies such as the United States, the exchange motive still be held and they write, "The 1982 National Long-Term-Care Survey indicates that family care givers provide between 80 and 90 percent of the informal care needed by older persons; that almost two-thirds of all care givers are children and other members of the extended family (the rest being spouses); that only 5 percent receive all their care from paid services; and that the estimated magnitude and duration of informal care giving, especially by females, are substantial."
11.The relationship between financial market development and population growth rate is analyzed empirically in Hammer (1986) .
12. See Hamermesh (1993) for a review.
reaching some extent to induce the demand of human capital, in other words, investment in human capital is not optimal unless physical capital per efficiency units of labor is beyond some level. However, in modern times, due to the fact that education is better rewarded than saving, agents prefer to have fewer and more educated children, than more non-educated children. Then, human capital accumulation begins to dominate the economic development as underlined in the demographic transition and economic growth theories of Galor and Weil (2000) , Moav (2002, 2004) , Galor and Mountford (2003) , Doepke (2004) , Lagerlof (2004) . However, capital-skill complementarity is mainly the twentieth century phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, the factory, interchangeable parts and the assembly line predominated Britain's production successively, leaving the artisan shop obsolete. 13 The mystery why skilled artisans destroyed weaving, spinning, and threshing machines during the Luddite and Captain Swing riots in nineteenth-century Britain, viewing the new machines would make their skills redundant, can be used as evidence supporting the capital-unskilled labor complementarity hypothesis during early industrial revolution. As argued by Acemoglu (2002a) , "For many problems in macroeconomics, development economics, labor economics, and international trade, whether technical change is biased towards particular factors is of central importance." In the following section, I will present evidence to show that there was a transition from skill-replacing technology to skill-biased technology. Consequently, largely due to the influence from demand factors, this transition led to the demographic transition as well, inducing the population growth rate first rises, then falls. Combining all the elements mentioned above, I provide a coherent framework to analyze the economic divergence and demographic transition in the world economic history. From a stagnated Malthusian economy to a sustained modern economy, from high fertility and high mortality rate to low fertility and low mortality rate, the world has changed so much, so dramatically that we need a unified theory, as argued by Galor (2004) , to explore the microfoundations of the process. Non-unified theories are always feasible at explaining one or several aspects, but inconsistent with some important ones. This kind of theory is inadequate, for the process is a continuous, coherent and interrelated one.
In the next section, some historical evidence will be presented to buttress my theory. I not only display evidence about the economic and demographic transition during the industrialization, like most of the related literature, such as Lucas (2002) , Hansen and Prescott (2000) , but show other evidence, paralleling the European experience, to demonstrate that it is the bad institutions in China that hampered the further development into industrial economy, well consistent with China's pre-modern economic stagnation and rocketed population growth.
Improvements in institutions provide the basis for Britain's Industrial Revolution and success in the subsequent wars with other European countries, and helped Britain become the most powerful country in the world at that time. The preconditions for a healthy economy, secure property rights, protection of their wealth, elimination of confiscatory government and capital market imperfection, are all satisfied after the political revolution. The new government, with its good reputation, has the ability to finance wars at an unprecedented level by issuing debt. In this view, this revolution is a kind of financial revolution as well. Good institutions pulled the 13. For descriptions of the two different technologies and explorations for causes of the transition between two technologies, see James and Skinner (1985) , Acemoglu (2002) , and Goldin and Katz (1998).
Britain's economy from the Malthusian trap generated in my model to the sustained economic growth, and Britain entered a completely new stage of economic development. However, even if there were good institutions after the Glorious Revolution, people chose high fertility in the subsequent period, for there existed capital-unskilled labor complementarity in the labor market. It does not mean that institutions and fertility relationship did not establish in this period. What I emphasize is that institutions are only used for cross-country comparative analysis in modern times, just because there is an adverse influence from the labor market as well. The capital-skill complementarity relationship only appeared around the twentieth century. From then, people started to substitute the quality of children for the quantity. Human capital began to be accumulated. Without human capital accumulation, the rate of return to physical capital will decline. In the same way, without physical capital accumulation, the return of human capital will decline. Therefore, in order to maximize their consumption after retirement, people choose both saving and quality of children for quantity. The population growth rate eventually declines.
Economists have analyzed western economies' taken-off extensively, resulting in the ignorance of a large fragment of human history, such as China's economic history. An explanation for China's economic growth and stagnation must therefore be part of any unified theory of long-run growth. The Needham puzzle, why industrial revolution did not occur in China, has attracted considerable attention from historians, but it has never been satisfactorily explained. In the thirteenth and fourteenth century, China's economic, industrial and technological development, in many aspects, had attained a level paralleling Britain's in the eighteenth century. But in the subsequent six hundred years, the stagnated economy and rapid population growth coexisted. I provide a coherent framework to account for this mystery-an explanation that fits both stagnated or even declined per capita income and rocketed population growth.
The paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will present two case studies, from China and Europe, to buttress my theory. Section 3 will describe the basic structure of my model. Several crucial assumptions will be proposed as well. The central results and dynamics of the model will be shown in Section 4. In the last section, the main points in my paper will be summarized, and I will also give some suggestions for further research.
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
In this section, I will describe how Britain escaped from the Malthusian stagnation to modern economic growth, emphasizing the role played by institutions, and explain why China, which possessed more advantages than Europe during the early period, did not industrial first, but entering a high-level equilibrium stagnation stage.
14 The population dynamics in both Europe and China accompanying the economic development are also analyzed to buttress my theory.
The historical evidence is highly consistent with my hypothesis. 14. The model in the following section is driven by exogenous changes in the institutions, so it will be helpful for me to describe the sources of these changes in this section in detail.
15. The major fact presented in this paper is consistent with the emphasis of a number of historians, including Deng (2000) , Edwards (1999) , Hartwell (1966) , Lal (1998) , Lo (1987) , Maddison (1999) , North and Weingast (1989) , and Park (1997) , among others. Therefore, many materials draw from them.
The Needham Puzzle Revisited and China's Pre-modern Population

Dynamics
European economic historians commonly acknowledge that the central question in economic history is the origin of the industrial revolution, while, for Chinese economic historians, the most important question is why the industrial revolution did not occur in China, despite of the superior advantages in almost all the elements. Needham devoted almost all his life to explore this question and many publications written by him are intended to discuss this question. Therefore, the question is usually called "Needham Puzzle". Subsequent analysis in this part will proceed as follows. First, I will describe the achievements in the 900-1250 A.D. period. 16 China at that time is considered as having possessed many hallmarks of industrial revolution. Secondly, I will proceed to present the development facts in 1400-1900 A.D., which includes the economic stagnation and population dramatic expansion, despite of several serious negative exogenous population shocks. Thirdly, the fiscal arrangements in both former and latter period will be presented to show that it is the fiscal arrangements that matter. In this process, the reform of the central and local government will also be analyzed to explore the causes of the above phenomena.
China's Economic Development Experience: 900-1900 A.D.
In this subsection, I will draw a general picture of the world's most populous country's economic development, presenting evidence to show that she was first prosperous and then lagged behind. I will divide the 900-1900 A.D. period into two, in which 900-1250 will be called the first period, and 1400-1900 will be called the second period in the subsequent analysis. 17 During the first period, China changed from a simple subsistence economy to a high level commercial and industrial development not matched elsewhere until the end of the eighteenth century. However, in the second period, like a sudden break, the economy and technology stagnated or even declined, but the population had quadrupled in the subsequent five hundred years. Generally speaking, the first period was one of intensive growth, but the following five hundred years were, except some interruptions, characterized by extensive growth. Economic historians reach a common point that the Sung period (906-1279) was the pre-modern peak, after which no 16. Since there were almost no significant changes before 900 A.D., and the living standards were constant, more or less, I will neglect the analysis of the economy before 900 A.D.. However, almost all the indicators during the Sung Dynasty, such as iron output per capita, income per capita growth, technological level, showed a rising trend like these in Britain in the eighteenth century, making economic historians almost commonly agree that industrial development in Sung Dynasty is distinctive with that many centuries before the Sung (Liu and Golas, 1961; Hartwell, 1962 Hartwell, , 1966 Hartwell, and 1967 Hollingsworth, 1969; Shiba, 1970; Ma, 1971; Elvin, 1973; Jones, 1981 and Gernet, 1982; McNeill, 1983; Bray, 1984 and Mokyr, 1990) .
17. During the 1250-1400 period, there are many exogenous shocks in this period, including the plagues, the wars with the Mongols. This is a period of transition in which political institutions were changed, data was quite inadequate, and population declined rapidly. Therefore, in the analysis below, this period is omitted.
significant progress took place. The subsequent five hundred years is defined by Elvin (1973) as a "high-level equilibrium trap", or by Skinner (1985) as a "regional cycles". First, the total and per capita iron output in China and Western Europe are presented separately, to show the industrial development in the two economies. As we know, the iron output is a major indicator of one country's industrial development, for enough iron output is a prerequisite for industrial development. We can see from the tables above that iron output levels are almost equivalent in China in 1078 and in Western Europe in 1700, the eve of the industrial revolution, both in the total and per capita level. If we look at the iron output only in China, there are also something interesting. In the output per capita level, the output per capita in 1078 is more than five times than that in 1932. And iron output per capita roughly tripled during the eleventh century alone. In spite of the large population in 1932, the total output in the two years is almost equivalent. When we compare these numbers, we should not forget that China in 1932 was much larger than in 1078 in area, and iron output is heavily correlated with geography. According to Hartwell (1966) , iron production in the Northern Sung increased nine-fold from 806 to 1078 A.D. and per capita output about six-fold, he infers that there was an "impressive expansion of mining and manufacturing in eleventh-century China".
A significant feature of modern economic growth is the decline of the relative price of industrial output. According to Edwards (1999) , the price of iron relative to grain dropped by a factor of four during the first period. Maddison's estimates show that during the second period, output per capita in China did not change. In a recent study based on many of the same sources, Maddison presents a similar view like me as summarized in his stylized outline of China's economic performance. Therefore, we can conclude that during the period 900-1250, China's output per capita dramatically increased, but remained at that level or even declined during the following five hundred years.
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As acknowledged commonly among historians, the technology level was more advanced than other countries during the first period, collected in great detail in Needham (1954 Needham ( -1998 . It is no doubt that China's ancient inventions, gunpowder, the magnetic compass, paper and printing, greatly facilitated the west's transformation from the Dark Ages to the sustained economic growth.
The Failure of Modern Growth Theory
As stated by Alwyn Young (1993) , "For their part, the Chinese experienced extraordinary technical progress up until the end of the Sung dynasty in the mid-thirteenth century, but then suffered from almost total technological stagnation (if not regression) until the nineteenth century, when they began to imitate European technology en masse. If one views technical change as the steady and never ending serendipitous by-product of production experience, then one is completely at a loss to explain the recurring pattern of technological improvement and stagnation apparent in premodern history." And he goes on arguing that, For details on the Chinese and European experiences mentioned above, see Elvin (1973) , Temple (1986) , and Mokyr (1990, chaps. 2, 9) . Jones (1988) provides a general survey of periods of growth and stagnation. I should emphasize the concavity alone (as opposed to boundedness) in the learning process is not sufficient to explain asymptotic stagnation. For 18. In fact, the dramatic increases mentioned above largely happened in eleventh century, showing a rapid version similar to Britain in eighteenth century.
, and , then converges to . Thus, population growth in the typical log-linear model overcomes the concavity in learning and prevents asymptotic stagnation. In the 600 years following the Sung dynasty, China experienced an enormous increase in its population. Contrary to the prediction of the log-linear learning model, this increase did not prevent technological stagnation.
The Transformation of China's Political Institutions
In this subsection, I will show that the transformation of China's political institutions, through changes of local and central fiscal arrangements, had influential impact on economic development. During the first period, local government had the authority to set tax rates, and corruption is low. However, after the political and bureaucracy reform, the rights of the military officials were replaced by civil bureaucracy, and central government had the sole right to set tax rates. In this period, corruption was widespread and property rights were highly insecure when expropriations were common. I will describe this transformation below in detail.
During the period 900-1250, the local government had the main power in setting tax rates. During the late Tang Dynasty following the An Lushan rebellion (755-763 A.D.), the military became professionalized and regional warlords became powerful. Although the civil service examination had emerged, the civil officials still had limited power compared with the military officials. According to Hucker (1985, p. 38-39) , during the late Tang Dynasty and Five Dynasty period ( a period of disunion and civil wars), regional warlords gained control of the local governments. In the Sung Dynasty, although the emperors successfully gained control of a strong imperial army, prefecture militias still existed and were under the control of local military officers. In this way, the military officials became involved in the civil administration at the prefecture level.
How did the emperors gain the military power from former military officials and send civil bureaucracy to substitute for the original positions occupied by military officials? I summarize the research achievements by Ho (1962, 168-171) , Hucker (1985, 45-48) , Kracke (1953, 54-57) , Lo (1987, 38-42) , Liu (1969 ), Wong (1975 as follows. The provision of the armies was entrusted to prefecture civil officials. The military officials were put on a salary basis thus becoming dependent on a government run by civil officials for their income. What is more, the prefecture civil officials were given a larger measure of authority in fiscal administration of the prefecture than they had ever possessed under previous periods in order to reduce the influence of the military officials at the prefecture level.
19 As argued by Wang (1995, 519-560) , tax revenue surplus above a quota for the central government was kept by the prefectures while for other goods the prefecture government forward a fixed fraction of the local tax revenue to the central government. However, the prefectural administration had few changes during the Sung Dynasty, despite of the big changes of the major government organization in the central level.
See Lo (1987, 70-74) . During the period 1400-1900, the central government had the absolute authority to set tax rates for the entire country, both local and central. The emperors after the Yuan Dynasty had the supreme rights to implement various policies, not like the emperors before. A famous example is that, with the objections of the policy critics, the coalition between Emperor Shen-tsung (Northern Sung Dynasty) and Chief Councilor Wang An-shi could not easily implement the famous New Policies Reform. 20 The following government reforms are largely summarized from Langlois (1988) , Chan (1982) , Hucker (1958) and Farmer (1976) . In 1380, the Prime Minister, who had authority over six ministries, was executed and the government position was permanently eliminated. The founding emperor of Ming Dynasty, Zhu Yuan-zhang, divided the administrative control among the six formerly subordinate ministries. The Grand Secretaries, associated with the Hanlin Academy and were officials of very low rank, was created to coordinate the six ministries and in charge of the ministry officials, who usually had much more experience in addition to having higher rank. The previous regional government structure was abolished and provincial authority across the civil, military bureaus and the provincial censorate were separated among three provincial agencies. As argued by Huang (1998) , Hucker (1958 Hucker ( , 1985 , Dreyer (1982) , Yang (1969 ), Wakeland (1982 and Chu (1962) , the Chinese emperors after the Yuan Dynasty became rulers of China within a government institution that left them largely unchallenged. During the five centuries, many authorities to set tax policy were delegated to local governments. According to Ho (1962) and Hsi (1972) , the civil examination system was also changed around 1400 AD. Based on the Confucian classics, emphasizing literary skills, these exams were taken by merchants as well, for the first time in Chinese history. The so-called educated elite, with Confucian classics embedded in mind, was the main instrument for imposing social and political order in a unitary state during the five centuries. The bureaucratic system in China almost facing no challenge from a landed aristocracy, an established church, a judiciary, dissident intellectuals, the military or the urban bourgeoisie, which were very powerful in Europe, led to a unitary state. However, in the west, any attempt to impose a unified bureaucratic order on the whole of Europe, such as by Charles V, Philip II, Napoleon, and Hitler, were unable to be successful.
Property Rights and Corruption in Ancient China
In this subsection, I will present evidence to show that during the first period, due to decentralized fiscal arrangement, there existed competition between different regions, therefore, the degree of corruption was low, and there were secure property rights that fostered economic growth. 21 Although it is a familiar theme of comparative economic histories that the high level of effective taxation, the low status of mercantile activity, poorly developed commercial law, and 20. See more details in Mu (1969) .
21. Actually, the macroeconomic results caused by decentralization and competition are already analyzed by North and Thomas and Jones (1981) , but they are lack of microfoundations to explore the link between causes and results.
high probabilities of state expropriation all discouraged private capital accumulation during the second period (Jones 1988, Chapter 4; Landes 1969, pp. 15-21; Fairbank 1992, Chapter 8) , I will analyze this issue from the fiscal arrangement perspective.
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During the second period, the central government set low tax rates in order to avoid the rebellion of the local governments by reducing the revenue of the local governments. This led to the result that the central government could not provide sufficient financial support to eliminate the widespread corruption. As argued by Lo (1987) , Huang (1974 Huang ( , 1998 and Wang (1973) , the salaries of civil officials during the later period were reported to be much lower than that during any previous period. Based on their calculations, the central government's total tax revenue was insufficient for operating budgets and wages. However, as documented by Hucker (1958) and Ho (1959) , the number of civil officials per capita increased between 1400 and 1600, from 5,400 to 16,000. In ancient China, government service was considered as the most honorable and in every sense the most worthwhile occupation. For more details, see Lin (1995) . Why did people regard the civil examinations so important in their career, if the salaries of the civil officials were so low? That is because of the expropriation. In addition, the magistrate operated his headquarters (yamen) with a staff of locally recruited clerks, policemen, jailers and guards. He levied taxes and maintained law and order for a district population rising from about 80,000 in the Sung to 300,000 in the Qing Dynasty. How can it be possible for such few people to manage such a big population? What is more, since there were virtually no lawyers or litigation in China, it was almost impossible for people to challenge bureaucratic decisions. Therefore, the widespread corruption was inevitable.
By contrast, the emergence of democracy accompanied the transformation from a strong Roman Empire to some weak states in the west. Although every king wants to encompass absolute power, their behaviors had an opposite effect. As written by Anderson (1979) , "the increase in the political sway of the royal state was accompanied, not by a decrease in the economic security of noble ownership, but by a corresponding increase in the general rights of private property".
There are many examples of civil officials expropriating goods during the second period.
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Many phenomena, such as widespread use of paper money, merchant activity, investment in large-scale enterprises, and the large amount of cash and non-agricultural goods collected as tax revenue by the central government, indicated the effective tax rates were quite low during the 22. The relationship between fiscal arrangement and corruption has been analyzed both empirically and theoretically. Fisman and Gatti (2002) examines the relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties empirically. Their results suggest that fiscal decentralization in government expenditure is strongly and significantly associated with lower corruption. Interjurisdictional competition, initially developed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) , states that political competition reduces the ability of bureaucrats to extract rents in exchange for services. Further analysis by Jin, Qian and Weingast (1999) highlights the role played by competition among localities in discouraging governments from establishing interventionist and distortionary policies that might drive away valuable factors of production to less interventionist jurisdictions. High level of Interjurisdictional competition, therefore, leads to lower levels of corruption in decentralized economies.
23. The examples presented below are mostly from Nancy Park (1997) .
first period. The central government's tax revenue, not including corruption, collected from non-agricultural activities during the early period was nine times that of the later period (Lo, 1987) .This is indirect evidence showing that the industrial activities reduced drastically after the political reform. When he was the magistrate of Yongchuan county in Sichuan province from 1764 to 1768, Xu Wenbi bemoaned the devastating effects of corruption on the Chinese populace, writing: "Wherever corruption manifests itself, there are a hundred stratagems to suck out the lifeblood of the people. How can one imagine that the wealth of the region would not be exhausted in the space of a few years? " Yin Huiyi (1691 -1748 , who served as Henan governor from 1737 to 1739, stated that avoiding corruption should be the primary goal of any provincial official. "An official who has been appointed to a post should, first and foremost, remain pure," he wrote, adding, "No matter whether his rank is lofty or humble, in the end, incorruptibility should be his most precious jewel" (Yin, 1940) . Foreign merchants in the late nineteenth century noted that the "annual profit" of civil officials was about one hundred times their official salary. In a 1782 collection of missionary observations and letters, Pere Amiot contended that corruption was the norm in the Qing bureaucracy, stating that "it is rare among the Chinese to find anyone in an official post who does not enrich himself, and the people regards as a species of rare bird any Mandarin who is disinterested up to a certain point" (Memoires, 1782). China's development facts can be summarized as follows. From the above table, we can see that since during the first period, corruption was rare in China, the population growth rate was low. Compared with Europe after England's Glorious Revolution in 17 th century and the subsequent century, albeit the capital-unskilled labor complementarity led to the rise of population growth rate, China still had much faster population growth rate. The deterioration of institutions during the later period in China induced its share of world population to increase from 23.5% to 36.6%, increasing from 103 million in 1500 to 381 million in 1820. Because so many resources were devoted to children rearing, there were only limited resources left, in other words, saving rate was too low, for further development. Therefore, in the second period, 1400-1900, there were no further economic growth, almost no technological innovation, but population increased rapidly.
Industrial Revolution and Demographic Transition
In this subsection, the importance of the role of political reform, for fostering an environment conducive to the accumulation of physical capital, and hence growth, will be emphasized in the process of industrial revolution, and the microfoundations of demographic transition will be analyzed to show how my theory works. Since the evidence for the relationship of the institutions and population growth rate has already been presented above, I will mainly analyze the third important hypothesis, capital-skill compelementarity. Since the two powerful forces, institutional improvement and capital-unskilled labor complementarity, overlapped in the early stage of modern economic growth when there is no human capital accumulation, there needs a reconcilement for the population growth rate, between the positive effect from the capital-unskilled labor complementarity and the negative effect from the good institutions after 24. I neglect the analysis of other periods because of the frequent large negative shocks. For example, in the mid-seventeenth century transition between the Ming and Qing, the serious negative shocks from savagery, smallpox and famine reduced the population by almost a third.
reform. However, the institutions are a permanent shock in this case, and the capital-labor ratio jumps to a new high level. Then, capital-labor is high, but does not attain the threshold level for human capital accumulation. Therefore, the high capital-labor ratio induces high population growth in the initial period. When the threshold level is attained, the economy enters the modern growth period. Human capital begins to dominate the process of economic development. Forces from both the rise of the saving rate and the increase of human capital accumulation lead population growth rate to decline. Therefore, the shape of population growth rate is hump-shaped (i.e. first rises, then declines).
Glorious Revolution and Financial Market Development in Britain
In this subsection, I argue that it is the Glorious Revolution that paved the way for the development of property rights and limits on monarchs' power, pulling the Britain's economy out of the Malthusian stagnation poverty trap, entering a completely new phase of economic development, i.e. modern economic growth. That is also what my model wants to emphasize, an important feature of multiple equilibrium, that an exogenous shock is needed to push the economy out of the original phase. 25 Before the Glorious Revolution, parliament played only a trivial role in the decisions over expenditure and investment. Therefore, the Crown had considerable discretionary power over how and on what the money was spent. Because the Crown always ran out of revenue, they just seized the property of citizens for compensation. As documented by Hill, "the government seized ￡130,000 of bullion which private merchants had placed in the Tower for safety, causing numerous bankruptcies." However, expropriations in economic history were not rare. My reading of economic history suggests that in the traditional society, if rulers did not maintain a comparative advantage in coercion, they soon failed to be rulers. It is the expansion of Atlantic trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as argued by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) , that enabled other political power to challenge the King. After the Glorious Revolution, society's political institutions were restructured by the Parliament in the Revolution Settlement. As argued by Keir (1966) , what is the most important in the Settlement is that the Revolution initiated the era of parliamentary "supremacy." It was now the "king in Parliament," not the king alone. After the Revolution Settlement, since the common law courts were very favorable to private rights, its supremacy was thereby assured. As written by North and Weingast (1989) , "Two factors made the new arrangements self-enforcing. First, the credible treat of removal limited the Crown's ability to ignore the new arrangements. Second, in exchange for the greater say in government, parliamentary interests agreed to put the government on a sound financial footing, that is, they agreed to provide sufficient tax revenue."
The financial systems improved a lot after the Glorious Revolution. 26 As Table 6 shows, after the Glorious Revolution, the Britain's fiscal conditions were improved a lot. In just nine years, 1688-1697, government expenditures had grown fourfold, to ￡7.9 million. What kind of forces could have such a big power except the improved institutions? This kind of fiscal 25. The material below largely draws from North and Weingast (1989) .
26. Rousseau and Sylla (2003) state that financial development played a crucial role for the US economy to become the world leader as well.
arrangement directly led to the success of the war with France, a protracted struggle for military predominance called the "Second Hundred Years War." Since banks and differentiated set of securities dramatically increased, saving for retirement became rather secure with the development of the financial market. Ashton reports that this "meant that men were less concerned than their fathers … to keep quantities of coin, bullion, and plate locked up in safes or buried in their orchards and gardens." Phyllis Deane describes the development of private capital markets with the rapid growth of public capital:
The secondary effects of the Bank's financial transactions on behalf of the government stemmed from the new financial instruments which were thus created … and because [the instruments]
issued by a credit-worthy borrower are themselves readily saleable, the effect was further to lubricate the channels linking saving and investment by creating a large stock of negotiable paper assets which new savers could buy. Similarly, the deposits from private sources could also be used as a basis for further credit to the private sector.
After the Glorious Revolution and a series of political reforms after that, the best institutions for securing property rights and developing financial markets at that time were established in Britain, pulling the Britain's economy out of the Malthusian stagnation poverty trap. 
Demographic Transition in Europe
In this subsection, I will show the evolution of three phases with demographic transition and its causes from the perspective of capital-skill complementarity in Europe, especially in Britain, which is the pioneer of industrial revolution. The process includes the Post-Malthusian and Modern Growth Regime. In Post-Malthusian Regime, the skill-replacing technologies dominated. Skills are not necessary for machine operation. Perceiving this, people did not invest in their children, but had a large number of children. There were abundant unskilled labors in the society. In Modern Growth Regime, when physical capital was accumulated enough to induce the formation of human capital, the rate of return on human capital is higher than that on physical capital. Perceiving this, people invested in their children. In addition, the importance of physical capital should not be diminished. These two forces reinforce each other, inducing the rapid decline of population growth rate. Summing up the above analysis, we can see that the population growth rate demonstrates a hump shape, that is, first rises, then falls.
As presented in introduction section, demographic transition experiences three regimes, which can be show explicitly in Figure 2. 
The Dominated Role of Physical Capital in the Initial Phase of Growth
Unlike other articles that underscoring the role of human capital accumulation, such as Lucas (2002), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1991), I argue that physical capital played a more fundamental role in the initial period of economic growth. As written by Marx (1974) , "Accumulate, accumulate! That is the Moses and the Prophets!" De Soto (2000) points out that the major determinant of why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails every where else is the scarcity of physical capital, and states in his book that, "In this book (The Mystery of Capital) I intend to demonstrate that the major stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from capitalism is its inability to produce capital." Evidence shows that before the twentieth century, education was motivated by a variety of other reasons, such as religion, enlightenment, social control, moral conformity, socio-political stability, social and national cohesion, and military efficiency. Human capital accumulation plays a dominated role only after some level of physical capital is already attained.
In the first period of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830), the economy was characterized by a significant increase of physical capital accumulation and low literacy rates. The role of physical capital in initial period of economic development has already underlined by many economic historians, notably North and Thomas (1973) , Rosenberg and Birdzell, (1985) and Hobsbawm (1968) . Within the framework of neo-classical theory the role of physical capital can be analyzed by means of growth accounting. When measuring over "long swings" in the nineteenth century, Abramovitz finds the contribution of physical capital to American economic growth to be far greater than the contribution of technological progress (measured as the residual after subtracting the contributions of capital and labor).
27
When Abramovitz adopts a periodisation that stretches over "long periods" instead of "long swings" his conclusion does not change: "…the sources of growth are quite at variance with the twentieth century results. It finds that the growth of capital intensity was a much larger source of labor productivity growth in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth." (Abramovitz 1993, p. 223) . For example, the diffusion 27. Empirical analysis conducted by Albers, Ronald, Adrian Clemens and Peter Groote (1994) also shows that between 1850-1880, nearly two thirds of GDP growth will be attributed to physical capital in Netherlands. of steam engines, was a slow process, in spite of its much higher productivity than other tools (Von Tunzelmann, 1978) . Until 1870, the industrial utilization of steam engines, even in Great Britain, was confined largely to mining, textiles, and metallurgy; several industries relied as much, or more, on water power (Cameron 1985) . Given the importance of physical capital accumulation in initial period of economic development, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) propose a theory that links financial development with physical capital accumulation, and ultimately generates sustained economic growth.
Skill-Replacing and Skill-Biased Technological Change and Population
Dynamics
In the original phase of economic development, technological progress had a strong capital-using bias. The scarcity of physical capital made people invest in their children's quality (human capital) unprofitable compared with quantity. Only in the twentieth century does intangible (human) capital come to the forefront. This is largely due to the technological changes in this period were unskilled labor biased. In our memory, when we mention labor markets in nineteenth century, the first impression is that skilled labors, like artisans, destroyed weaving, spinning, and threshing machines during the Luddite and Captain Swing riots. Economists have proposed many hypotheses to explain the labor market transformation. For example, Acemolgu (2002) argues that the choice of production technologies is quite different. In the nineteenth century, when unskilled labors were abundant due to rural-urban migration, it was profitable for producers to choose skill-replacing technologies. In the later period, there were large supplies of skilled labors partly due to many exogenous shocks, such as high-school movement during the early twentieth century. Producers chose skill-biased technologies. For example, as argued by Smith (2005) , enrolments at Oxford and Cambridge in 1850 were lower than at any point in the previous two hundred year. Adam Smith writes "The greatest part of the public professor have, for these many years given up altogether the pretence of teaching." in the Wealth of Nations. After 1870 the accumulation of physical capital became less dominant a source of growth, but until the turn of the century whose contribution remained important. Our impression and the facts have been consistent only in the early twentieth century. As argued by Landes (1969, p. 340) "although certain workers-supervisory and office personnel in particular-must be able to read and do the elementary arithmetical operations in order to perform their duties, a large share of the work of industry can be performed by illiterates as indeed it was especially in the early days of the industrial revolution". Mitch (1992) gives an example that, in 1841, only 4.9% of male workers and only 2.2% of female workers were in occupations in which literacy was strictly required. Traditional means could adequately meet the requirements for technical skills, albeit there were many new machines invented in that period (Green, 1990) . Sanderson (1972) argues that the low skill requirements have been declined over this period, writing "One thus finds the interesting situation of an emerging economy creating a whole range of new occupations which The signs of significant capital-skill complementarity emerged as early as in the 1910s. Goldin and Katz (1998, p.695) describes the process of the transition, "… the switch to electricity from steam and water-power energy sources was reinforcing because it reduced the demand for unskilled manual workers in many hauling, conveying, and assembly tasks". Galor and Moav (2003) presents a lot of evidence that in the later period of industrial revolution, education reforms in Europe, led by the capitalists, were designed primarily to satisfy the increasing skill requirements in the process of industrialization. 29 As argued by Crafts and Thomas (1986) , the source of Britain's industrial leadership in the 19th century was a favorable endowment of resources, providing sufficient physical capital, whereas Britain's deficiency in the latter part of the century was a scarcity of human capital which was essential in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution.
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
Consider a closed two period lived overlapping generations economy extends over infinite horizons in the process of development. 30, 31 There is only one single good in the economy, used either as an investment good or a consumption good. The good is produced with physical capital and human capital. Aggregate physical capital is determined by the savings in the preceding period. My theory proceeds along the line with the life cycle-permanent income theory proposed originally by Fisher (1930) and later refined and given empirical content by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957) , which states that each individual consumes his life time income, and over the individual's lifetime, his consumption is spread evenly, whereas his income is earned during pre-retirement years.
28. Due to the availability of data, the signature level is often used to proxy the literacy rate. Using this method, many authors find that the literacy rate stagnated or even dropped during the early eighteenth century. For example, Robert Gallman (1988) exams the signature rates in colonial Perquimans county, and finds that the evolution of literacy rate was not monotone. The level of signature literacy of free persons dropped sharply from the end of the seventeenth century to the early eighteenth century, rose moderately thereafter, and then strongly to the third quarter of that century. Sanderson (1995) claims that literacy rate was stagnant over the period 1760-1830.
29. The large increase of human capital accumulation was largely due to the supply factors from industrialists (Galor and Moav, 2003) . This led to the institutional change in 1868, when the British government set up the
Parliamentary Select Committee on Scientific Education which led to 1870 Education Act and the 1902 Balfour
Act-the education reform in England that marked the consolidation of a national education system and the creation of a publicly supported secondary school system 30. The point of departure of my model is the Samuelson (1958 )-Diamond (1965 overlapping generations framework. The basic structure is similar to Cinyabuguma (2004) , Galor (1992) , Galor and Moav (2002 , and Maoz and Moav (2004) .
31. The OLG model is largely used for modeling dynamic economic behavior over discrete infinite time.
Production of Final Output
Production occurs within a period according to a neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale, production technology. The output produced at time t, , is
where and are the aggregate quantities of physical capital and human capital separately in period t, in which the quantities of human capital are measured in efficiency units.
A is the technology employed in production, which for simplicity is fixed over time. 32, 33 The production function, , is therefore strictly monotonic increasing, strictly concave, satisfying the conventional neoclassical boundary conditions that assure the existence of an interior solution to the producers' profit-maximization problem.
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Producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor, , and the rate of return to capital, , producers in period t choose the level of employment of capital, , and efficiency units of labor, , so as to maximize profits. 
Preferences
Preferences of an individual of generation are defined over consumption in period , , and the quantities of the children, . The preferences are presented by a quasi-linear utility function,
As we know, the quasi-linearity of the utility function allows us to derive simple results and to weaken the influence of income effects. 
The Formation of Human Capital
For simplicity's sake, we assume the formation of human capital needs only money, and time plays no role in the process. The acquired level of human capital increases with the rise of education expenditure. However, even in the absence of real expenditure individuals acquire one 41. In reality, there is a subsistence level, only above which the individual can alive. Under this assumption, we can formulate the utility function as the following: ) ln( 1 c c n U t t t − + = + . As will become apparent, the adoption of this formulation would not affect the qualitative analysis, but would greatly increase the complexity of the dynamical system. 42. Children not only provide utility to parents analogous to the latter's current consumption of goods but more importantly, distinctively from previous literature, serve as channels of investment for the provision of their old age consumption.
efficiency unit of labor-basic skills, or innate endowment.
is the expenditure on education spent by an individual in period . The number of efficiency units of labor of generation
, is a strictly increasing, strictly concave function of the education expenditure. That is,
where .The restrictions of the human capital production function intend to show that under some conditions, investment in human capital is not optimal. This assumption is more realistic, while Inada conditions are always assumed for the simplicity of computation, by avoiding corner solution. 
Optimization
The individual's optimization problem in period with perfect foresight is, The individual in period chooses fertility level, also the population growth rate , expenditure on education , and saving , to maximize his utility. The optimal fertility level of the individual in period is, t
The optimal saving level of the individual in period is, t
As for optimal level of expenditure on education, due to the change of the Inada Condition, the results indicate that there are two possibilities. For the convenience of analysis below, we assume, Given the properties of , there exists a unique capital-labor ratio , below which individuals do not invest in human capital, due to the absence of enough physical capital. That is,
where . As follows from (2), where . Since , , and
, it follows that the optimal expenditure on education in period is a function of the capital-labor ratio in the subsequent period. Therefore, 
Aggregate Physical and Human Capital Accumulation
After optimization, the savings, expenditure on education and fertility level are determined optimally. In equilibrium, aggregate savings must be equal to next period's aggregate capital stock, so aggregate physical capital stock in period 1 + t , , and aggregate human capital stock in period , are given by
As we know, is the number of individuals in period . So that
We can see from (15) and (16) that the aggregate physical and human capital are determined by fertility level, savings and expenditure on education simultaneously, which are determined by capital-labor ratio ultimately. We can get the capital-labor ratio as follows, where the initial level of capital-labor ratio, , is assumed to be,
because we want to analyze the demographic and economic transition in economic history. Under this assumption, we can see the whole process of economic development.
THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT
This section develops a dynamic model of economic growth and demographic transition, emphasizing the role of institutions. As shown in the above section, the three choice variables are determined solely by the capital-labor ratio. Therefore, conditional on institutions, the evolutionary path of the economy depends on the capital-labor ratio. The dynamic system is given by, ) ( The process of economic development experiences the following three regimes. In the first regime, people always choose high fertility as an alternative way of saving, and physical capital is scarce. When there is a sufficiently big institutional shock, the economy enters the second regime. Since and people are perfect-foresight, rises, but declines. Therefore, having more children is optimal compared with saving. This leads to the rise of population growth rate and the decline of saving rate. When , the economy enters Modern Growth
Regime. In this regime, investing in human capital is optimal compared with other choices. Because the rate of return to human capital will decline if there is no sufficiently physical capital,
saving is also indispensable. Therefore, people always choose quality of children and saving for quantity.
Malthusian Regime: Physical Capital Accumulation
In this regime, since the rate of return to physical capital is higher than that to human capital, there is no human capital accumulation. When institutions do not change, all the important economic indicators are constant, like the Malthusian economy.
Regime One is defined as the time interval . In this regime, due to the low rate of return to human capital, people do not spend expenditures on their children's education. So the skill level of worker force is the same as the endowment level. That is, . The capital-labor ratio becomes,
For the simplicity of computation, we assume,
Then, we can get
, there is always a positive ρ satisfying the above equation. 43 After computation, we can get the solution as follows,
Evolution of the Economy
This section demonstrates that during Regime One, there is no human capital accumulation, and when institutions are unchanged, wherever the economy starts in this regime, it falls back to the Malthusian stagnation equilibrium, where income per capita, population growth rate, and saving rate are all constant.
43. Since capital-labor ratio is always positive, we drop the negative solution. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, under the bad institutio nder the good institutions, the economy moves on the Curve OB. Point A and B are stable points. Under bad institutions, whenever the economy starts, it will converge to Point A. At this point, population growth rate is high and saving rate is low. When institutions improve, the economy moves to the Curve OB and will converge to Point B. The saving rate is higher and population growth rate is lower at Point B. What I refer to the institutional shocks above are all permanent shocks, and any short-term shock will still go back to the stable point again, as the figure shows. C growth rate and saving rate are constant in equilibrium.
Proof: From (1), we can get the income per capita y , We can conclude that the income per capita in the Malthusian stage keeps constant in equilibrium.
In the same way, we can get, Remark 1 In 900-1250 A.D., both China and Europe had a similar decentralized tax system.
But since there was a larger population in China in the initial period, which contributed to more technological innovations, the living standard in China was higher than that in Europe. In 1400-1900 A.D., contrary to Europe, the government of China adopted the centralized tax system, which induced heavy effective tax rate. Due to the insecurity of saving, people chose high fertility as an alternative way of saving, which leads to the rocketed population growth and stagnated or even declined per capita income in the latter period. In this way, it is high effective tax rate, or high corruption, that induced physical capital scarcity that blocked modern industrial development in China.
Proposition 1 In Regime One, the economy demonstrates the Malthusian economic properties:
When there are no institutional shocks to the model economy, all the important properties, such as the population growth rate, income per capita, and saving rate, are constant. If there are positive shocks to the model economy, in equilibrium, saving rate rises, population growth rate declines and income per capita increases.
Post-Malthusian Regime: Transitional Period
Post-Malthusian Regime can be seen as part of Malthusian Regime. However, when institutional shock is big enough, there is no equilibrium. Conditional on institutions, the economy moves along the two curves endogenously. We can define this regime as the interval on
Curve OD'E' in Figure 7 . In this regime, the rate of return to human capital is still lower than physical capital. However, perfect-foresight individual expects high capital-labor ratio in the next period. Because wage is positively related to capital-labor ratio and interest rate is negatively related to it, investment in children is optimal compared with investment in physical capital. People choose to have more children, less saving, as old-age support.
Lemma 3 In the Post-Malthusian Regime, income per capita and population growth rate rises, but saving rate declines temporarily.
Proof: From (24) and
We can conclude that income per capita rises in this regime. Therefore, the saving rate is inversely related to population growth rate. In sum, the population growth rate rises and saving rate declines temporarily in this regime.
Modern Growth Regime: Human Capital Accumulation
In this regime, I will show that the high capital-labor attainment induces the emergence of human capital. However, this does not mean that if the positive (temporary) shock is big enough to pull the economy into the stage of human capital accumulation, modern economic growth will begin. The fact is, even if human capital has emerged, if the capital-labor ratio is not higher than the modern economic growth threshold, the economy will be pulled back into the Malthusian economy as well. That is because, in the first stage of this regime, the rate of return to human capital is still lower than that to physical capital. People will choose quantity of children, not quality, even if the original high level of capital-skill ratio attracted individuals in the last period to spend money on the expenditure of children's education. In the second stage of regime two, the rate of return to human capital accumulation is higher than that to physical capital. Therefore, people also choose quality, not quantity of children to support their old age. The two forces from physical and human capital reinforce each other to induce population growth rate declines dramatically. However, if the institutional shock is sufficiently big, the economic path is OD'E', as shown in Figure 7 , jumping directly into the second stage of Regime Three.
In order to characterize the dynamics of the system, it will be useful to assume a particular functional form for the human capital production function. For simplicity's sake, I will assume
Other forms of human capital production function satisfying the strict assumptions above will not change the qualitative results obtained below. Under this assumption, we can get 2 / 1 = γ . What I want to state is that due to the inappropriate use of the idea of old age support in modern developed countries, φ will be looked as social security tax rate, which is equivalent with my above definition because of the homogenous economy. 45. For one of the most recent application of this method, see Alders and Broer, (2005) .
From (11), (12) and (13), we can obtain the form of the human capital production function as follows, 
From (27) and (28) 
In order for economic development to sustain, it is assumed that the technology is sufficiently productive. That is,
is a cumbersome expression of these four parameters.
Since, Under the above equations, and with the first regime analysis, we can depict the evolution of economy, from an epoch of stagnation to modern economic growth, as in Figure 6 .
There are two steady states, when
Then, due to other parameters of the equation, we cannot decide whether is monotonically determined, however, when
Therefore, as λ rises, the curve in Figure 7 moves upwards as the figure shows.
Evolution of the Economy
Similar to the above analysis of Regime One, in this regime, my analysis proceeds under two conditions, conditional dynamics and unconditional dynamics. Conditional dynamic analysis is the analysis conditional on institutions, in other words, under the assumption that institutions do not change. So does unconditional dynamic analysis. In the analysis below, we see how the income per capita, saving rate and population growth rate evolve when the institutions are changed and unchanged. economy under invariant institutions.
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The curv rves join together, but using different values of Figure 6 illustrates the growth periods of the e shows multiple equilibria. 47 Ultimately, two economic growth periods emerge. As the figure shows, one is Malthusian stagnation with no growth of income per capita, and the other one is modern economic growth, with k rising continuously. Any economy starting at points lower than Point C will converge to the Malthusian stagnation, with constant saving rate and population growth rate. In the same way, any economy starting at higher than Point C will enter the modern economic growth stage, with accelerating economic growth. Conditional analysis shows that history determines where the economy goes, which is also a feature of multiple equilibria. Figure 7 illu nstitutional shock is temporary and not big enough to pull the economy to modern growth period, then even if there is human capital accumulation, the rate of return to human capital is lower than that to physical capital. People still choose quantity for quality of the children. This leads to the rise of the population growth rate, but the decline of income per capita. Although this process generates the hump shaped population dynamics as well, it is not what my model want to generate. If institutional shock is permanent, the economy jumps from Curve OA'B' to Curve OD'E'. This path is the extension of what I analyzed in the above section, as k k k* < < defined as the Post-Malthusian Regime.
Conditional Dynamics
Lemma 4 When the institutions do not change, the population growth rate first rises and then
, population growth rate rises, due to the skill-replacing technological change; when k k t≥ , population growth rate declines, due to the skill-biased technological change.
Proof: As follows from (9), we can get Therefore, the population growth rate first rises, then falls.
On Curve OD'E', i.e., when the institutional shock is sufficiently big, the economy enters into Modern Economic Growth directly. Simple manipulation leads to the conclusion that the population growth rate declines directly.
Lemma 5 With no variation of institutions, from the long run perspective, the saving rate rises definitely.
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Proof: As follows from (10), we can obtain the saving rate is, 48. Under the assumption of pure life cycle saving, aggregate saving rate would decline modestly during early stages of the demographic transition, then rise quite substantially thereafter.
Unconditional Dynamics
Lemma 7 As institutions improve, population growth rate declines in the regime three. As the same with the result in Regime One, the population growth rate declines in this regime as well.
Proof:
Lemma 8
In the modern growth regime, the saving rate rises as institution improves.
Proof: From (34), we can see that If we do not take institutions into consideration, income per capita rises; saving rate rises; population growth rate falls. When there is improvement in institutions, income per capita rises; saving rate rises; population growth rate falls.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Understanding the causes of economic development and underdevelopment has been a central concern of economics since its inception. One short article cannot do justice to all the determinants of such a complex social process as that of industrialization, which explains the focus here upon what I regard as the prime determinants of that process, institutions, physical and human capital. This paper develops a theory characterizing many main hallmarks in the process of economic development. Physical and human capital are two basic ingredients of industrialization, but in combination with institutions, they produced a variety-a spectrum, in fact-of patterns of industrialization. For the simplicity of analysis, I divide this process into three parts, Malthusian Stagnation defined as Regime One, and Modern Economic Growth defined as Regime Three, with Post-Malthusian Regime defined as Transitional Regime (Regime Two). Institutions, as an exogenous shock to the economy, are the most important driving force between the two regimes. People choose savings or material support from children to maximize the last period's consumption. The investment of human capital is not always optimal for parents. In the Malthusian period, there is no human capital accumulation. As institutions evolve, people prefer saving to quantities of children. In the modern period, when rate of return to human capital is higher than that to physical capital, people choose to invest in their children, other than the quantities of their children. Therefore, ultimately, population growth rate declines, and saving rate rises.
There are several distinctive contributions. First, in contrast to previous literature, which emphasizes the motive for having children is altruism, running from parents to children, I model the demographic transition using the hypothesis that children as investment goods, provide material support to their old age parents. Second, this is the first theory, to my knowledge, that takes institutions into theoretical analysis to account for the demographic transition and long-run growth. Third, my theory complements existing theories on demographic transition and long-run growth, which cannot generate the population and economic dynamics in pre-modern China. Fourth, the rise of the saving rate during the process of economic development, which is analyzed by Laitner (2000) and Echevarria (1997) emphasizing the role played by economic structural change, is analyzed in my paper as well, from an alternative way.
As we know, exogenous and endogenous growth theory have their own advantages to interpret the growth facts. In my model, in the initial phase of economic development, the economy exhibits the exogenous growth properties. There is a steady state conditional on institutions. When institutions improve, income per capita grows. In the latter stage, institutions still can be used for cross country income differences analysis, but play a minor role. Endogenous growth period (i.e. growth without exogenous sources) begins. The theory can account for many phenomena and puzzles in economic history. In the Historical Evidence section I present two examples. One shows how population growth and institutions interrelate, and the other one shows how skill-replacing and skill-biased technological changes generate the non-monotonic demographic transition during the Industrial Revolution in Britain.
Much remains to be done. Institutions in my framework are largely verbal, although I emphasize the first order importance of property rights, rather than mathematical and thus, by its very nature, not fully specified. There are also many important and tempting issues left out of my framework. Further research constructing formal models incorporating and extending ideas like life expectancy, mortality, income distribution, rural-urban migration, expectations, to make the model more realistic, is the most important task ahead. Due to the simplicity and transparency of the model, extensions to many directions as mentioned above are feasible.
